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1  Background
Economic development occurs unevenly across geographic space. Indeed, almost 
all nations can identify both more-developed and less-developed regions. Egypt is 
no exception: it is characterized by a high concentration of production factors and 
resources in governorates comprising the greater Nile delta—Lower Egypt. These con-
centrations parallel and perhaps even cause the nation’s uneven distribution of wealth 
and population across regions. The interregional wealth disparity crops up in the form 
of other socio-economic conditions, ranging from health and education to labor market 
conditions (World Bank 2012).
Interest by policymakers on regional issues within Egypt has been recently renewed 
with the publication of the World Bank (2012) report Reshaping Egypt’s Economic Geog-
raphy: Domestic Integration as a Development Platform. It investigates Egypt’s regional 
economic growth, explores the causes for geographically unbalanced development, and 
proposes policy options to make unbalanced growth compatible with inclusive develop-
ment. Spatially connective infrastructure is a primary pillar for future policies to address 
the country’s spatial disparities. In a context of growing global integration and increasing 
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international competition, new challenges are likely to emerge in Egypt’s regional econ-
omies. It is hoped that they may be partially addressed via integration of the nation’s 
economic periphery and core. One way to better integrate the nation is to improve its 
transportation network.
This paper focuses on the potential regional impacts of domestic integration on 
regional inequality in Egypt. It looks not only at the domestic integration of the coun-
try by improving links among regions’ domestic demanders and suppliers, but also by 
improving the nation’s links to the broader world economy.
The Egyptian economy is not internally homogenous. It presents variations across 
both industries and regions. Thus, it is expected that the impact of economic policies 
will vary across different governorates (mohaafazaat). In the context of renewed atten-
tion to the spatial aspects of economic development, both from a theoretical perspective 
(Fujita and Krugman 2004) and from a policy perspective (World Bank 2009), there is a 
growing need for economic and socio-economic models that could provide new insights 
into the nation’s regional planning process.
In this paper, we develop one such tool: an interregional computable general equilib-
rium (ICGE) model for Egypt. The work is based on previous work by Haddad (1999), 
Lahr (2001), Haddad and Hewings (2005), Álvarez-Martínez and Lahr (2013) and Haddad 
(2014a, b). The consequent model is developed with an eye toward gaining added insight 
to the ex ante assessment of domestic integration policies in the country. As highlighted 
in Haddad et al. (2011a, p. 45), modeling of transportation costs provides an important 
way of dealing explicitly with theoretical issues related to integrated regional systems. The 
explicit modeling of transportation costs in the ICGE model, which is based on origin–
destination flows, organically will take into account the spatial structure of the Egyptian 
economy. That is, the ICGE model is integrated with a stylized geo-coded transportation 
network model, thereby augmenting the general model framework for understanding the 
role of infrastructure investment in regional economic development. There are important 
proposals of infrastructure projects contemplated in the Egyptian government’s five-year 
plan—such as the Cairo–Asyout road improvement, the Suhag-Red Sea improvement, 
and the Cairo Ring Road improvement. For the sake of future fiscal and policy decisions, 
their ex ante impacts ought to be assessed (Felkner et al. 2012).
To examine possible spatial effects of transportation cost reductions in Egypt induced by 
transportation infrastructure improvements, we adopt a cost-competitiveness approach. 
It reviews possible relative changes in the regional costs and on different demand struc-
tures. Following Haddad et al. (2011), we scrutinize the link between the freeness of trade 
and the equilibrium distribution of activities. It is clear from many prior studies (Yang and 
Lahr 2008; Aroca et al. 2008; Hu and McAleer 2004) that domestic economic integration 
is effected by reducing transportation costs. There is no reason to expect this should not 
be the case among Egyptian regions. For our model, we adopt a broad concept of market 
access and supplier areas that includes both domestic and foreign trade. To calibrate the 
ICGE model, we employ a fully specified interregional input–output system that includes 
commodity flows across Egypt’s regions as well as to the rest of the world. Moreover, we 
allow labor and capital to be mobile; this also spurs interregional integration.
In what follows, Sect. 2 introduces the main features of the ICGE model. Section 3 is 
a discussion of the details of how we modeled transportation costs and integrated the 
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ICGE model via a stylized network using GIS techniques. In Sects. 4 and 5, we design 
and simulate two experiments and discuss the main results. Final remarks follow in an 
attempt to evaluate our findings and put them into perspective, considering their exten-
sion and limitations.
2  The ICGE model1
We develop an ICGE model for Egypt.2 Drawing on recent experience reported in 
Haddad (2014a, b) in the development of an ICGE model for Lebanon under conditions 
of limited information, we develop the interregional structure of the model.3 Incorporat-
ing the ability to model transportation costs changes that explicitly affect interregional 
relationships enables investigations into important issues related to integrated regional 
systems. The model developed in this paper is designed for analyzing policies related to 
changes in Egypt’s existing transportation infrastructure.
Our model has R endogenous regions, r =  1, …, R, and one exogenous region (the 
rest of the world), ROW, that exhaust Egypt’s space economy. Economic interactions 
take place inside (intraregional trade) and outside the endogenous regions (interregional 
and international trade). The regional setting of the model recognizes the economies of 
R = 27 Egyptian governorates (mohaafazaat) (Fig. 1).
Agents’ behavior is modeled at the regional level, accommodating variations in the 
structure of regional economies. An important feature of the model is the detailed treat-
ment of interregional trade flows in the Egyptian economy, in which interregional com-
modity flows are fully specified by origin and destination. The building blocks of the 
“structural” components of the ICGE model are very standard in their specifications.4 
Results are based on a bottom-up approach—i.e. national results are aggregates (sums) 
of the individual regional results. The model identifies nine production/investment sec-
tors in each region producing nine commodities (Table 1), one representative household 
in each region, one government in each region, and a single foreign area that trades with 
each domestic region.5 Each industry uses two local primary factors (capital and labor) 
to produce along with regional material endowments. Special groups of equations define 
capital accumulation relations.
The model is structurally calibrated for 2011. A rather complete dataset for Egypt is 
available for 2011—the year of the national input–output accounts used to the estimate 
of the interregional input–output database. Additional structural data for 2007–2011 
complement that database.
Our model is a Johansen-type model. That is, solutions are obtained by solving the 
system of linearized equations of the model following the Australian tradition. A typical 
result shows the percentage change in the set of endogenous variables, after a policy is 
carried out, compared to their values in the absence of such policy, in a given environ-
ment. The schematic presentation of Johansen solutions for such models is standard in 
the literature. More details can be found in Dixon and Parmenter (1996).
1 This section draws on Haddad (2014a).
2 To our knowledge, this is the first fully operational ICGE for Egypt.
3 See also Peter et al. (1996), Haddad (1999), and Haddad and Hewings (2005).
4 Peter et al. (1996) and Haddad (1999).
5 The domination in Egypt of Mediterranean ports makes the latter a fairly realistic assumption.
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2.1  Overview
The basic structure of the ICGE model is standard; it is comprised of three main blocks 
of equations that determine both supply and demand relations as well as market clear-
ing conditions. In addition, various regional and national aggregates, such as aggregate 
employment, aggregate price levels, and balance of trade, are defined. Nested produc-
tion functions and nested household demand functions are employed.
Fig. 1 Governorates in Egypt
Table 1 Sectors/products in the ICGE model
1. Agriculture, forestry and fishing
2. Mining and quarrying
3. Manufacturing
4. Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply
5. Construction
6. Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles
7. Transportation and storage
8. Other services
9. Public services
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Figure  2 illustrates the basic production technology adopted in the model, which is 
a common specification in regional models. Dotted-line boxes identify the functional 
forms used at each level of the model hierarchy. Two broad categories of inputs are rec-
ognized: intermediate inputs and primary factors. Producers in each regional industry 
choose input requirements per unit of output through optimizing behavior (cost mini-
mization). The nested production Leontief/CES technology requirements constrain pro-
duction levels. Leontief technology assures that firms use intermediate inputs in fixed 
proportion to the combined set of production factors (labor and capital) at the first level, 
but at a second level the two factors can substitute for each other as can domestically 
produced and imported intermediate inputs. At the third level, domestically produced 
inputs are cost-based bundled combinations of inputs from the nation’s different regions.
The treatment of the household demand structure is based on a nested CES/linear 














































Fig. 3 Nesting structure of regional household demand
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from a Stone–Geary utility maximization problem, the solution of which follows hierar-
chical steps. The structure of household demand follows a nesting pattern that enables 
different elasticities of substitution to be used. At the bottom level, substitution occurs 
across different domestic sources of supply. Utility derived from the consumption of 
domestic composite goods is maximized. In the subsequent upper level, substitution 
occurs between domestic composite and imported goods.
Equations for other components of final demand for commodities include the speci-
fication of export demand and government demand. Exports face downward-sloping 
demand curves, indicating a negative relationship with their prices in the world market.
The nature of the input–output data enables the isolation of the goods supplied by the 
government—whose demand follows changes in tax revenues. However, “productive” 
activities carried out by the public sector cannot be isolated from those by the private 
sector. Thus, government entrepreneurial behavior is dictated by the same cost minimi-
zation assumptions applied to the private sector.
An important feature of the ICGE model is the ability to explicit model the costs of 
moving products based on origin–destination pairs according to the allocation of trade 
margins. The model is calibrated taking into account the specific trade cost structure of 
each commodity flow. Such structure is physically constrained by the available transpor-
tation network, modeled in a stylized geo-coded transportation module (see Sect. 3).
Other definitions in the ICGE core module include: basic and purchaser prices of com-
modities, components of real and nominal GRP/GDP, regional and national price indices, 
money wage settings, factor prices, employment aggregates, and capital accumulation 
relations.6
2.2  Structural database
The ICGE database requires detailed sectoral and regional information about the Egyp-
tian economy. An interregional input–output system for Egypt is used in the process of 
calibration of the structural coefficients of the model. Recent efforts in the construction 
and improvement of such database are currently under way as part of an initiative 
involving researchers from the Regional and Urban Economics Lab at the University of 
São Paulo (NEREUS), the Rutgers Economic Advisory Service (R/ECON) at the Edward 
J. Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy at Rutgers University, and the Faculty 
of Commerce at the Zagazig University. A fully specified interregional input–output 
database has been estimated under conditions of limited information. The development 
of the input–output system relied basically on the following databases: (1) aggregate 
input–output table for year 2010/2011 at basic prices; (2) Household Income, Expendi-
ture, and Consumption Survey, HIECS 2010/2011; (3) sectoral employment data, by 
governorate; (4) other socio-economic indicators by governorate; and (5) estimated 
travel time among governorates’ capitals.7 Summary indicators of the database are pre-
sented in Tables 2 and 3.
6 The core system of equations of the model is available in the “Appendix”.
7 More details on the procedures adopted can be found in Haddad (2014b), who describes a similar approach for Lebanon.
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2.3  Behavioral parameters
As is unfortunately typical, direct empirical estimates of the key parameters of the model 
are not readily available. We thus were forced to rely on estimates from existing studies, 
where pertinent and available, or on “best guesstimates” based on typical values used in 
similar models for developing nations. In the case of ICGE models, the degree of inter-
regional interaction of all markets includes different dimensions. One possible dimen-
sion of “openness” of regional economies is encompassed in the elasticities of 
substitution between similar commodities produced in different regions. A common 
assumption widely used in interregional CGE models, the Armington assumption, con-
siders similar commodities produced in different regions as close substitutes, but unique 
goods. It allows for the incorporation of estimates of elasticities of substitution between 
domestically produced products and similar imported products, and between regionally 
produced products and similar products from other regions, suggesting nested multiple 
stage demand functions. Spencer (1988) points out that this assumption is extraordinar-
ily convenient for (interregional) CGE work, since it admits the presence of cross hauling 
in a standard neoclassical model and reduces concern about small changes having big 
effects on the pattern of trade and production (ruling out specialization in consump-
tion). However, econometric estimates for such elasticities for interregional substitution 
are extremely rare, and modelers often have to extrapolate from estimates for their 
equivalent parameters for substitution between domestic and foreign commodities. In 
our model, parameter values for international trade elasticities, σ’s in Eq.  (2) in the 
“Appendix”, were set to 1.5;8 regional trade elasticities, σ’s in Eq. (1), were set at the same 
values as the corresponding international trade elasticities.
Substitution elasticity between primary factors, σ’s in Eq. (3), was set to 0.5. The mar-
ginal budget share in regional household consumption, β’s in Eq. (5), was calibrated from 
the input–output data, assuming the average budget share to be equal to the marginal 
budget share. We have set to −2.0 the export demand elasticities, η’s in Eq. (7).
2.4  Closure rules
To capture the effects of regional integration, the simulations are carried out using both 
short- and long-run closure rules.9 The model has no dynamic attributes. Thus, any sim-
ulations run using the ICGE model capture the effects associated with a static impact-
effect question, i.e., given the structure of the economy, what-if questions are addressed 
in a comparative static framework. Short- and long-run considerations differ in the way 
the equilibrating mechanisms are set through specified closure rules. Structural changes 
are captured only by evaluating the re-allocation of resources.
8 Eby Konan and Maskus (1996) used the value 2.0 for such parameter in their study on trade liberalization scenarios 
for Egypt; based on that, Hendy and Zaki (2013) adopted the same value in their CGE model to analyze a 10 % tariff 
cut in Egyptian imports.
9 The system of equations provides the theoretical structure of the model. In the implementation of the ICGE model, 
the linearized version of the model was condensed by eliminating some equations and variables, generating a reduced 
version with 24,443 equations and 43,376 variables. To close the model, values for 18,933 variables—usually technical-
change variables—have to be set exogenously (the number of endogenous variables must equal the number of equa-
tions). The condensation procedure, i.e., the reduction of the size of the model, is carried out by substituting out 
variables that are to be endogenous and are of less interest to the analysis and presentation of the simulation results, and 
by omitting variables that are to be exogenous and not shocked in the simulations. The nominal exchange rate was set as 
the numéraire.
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Giesecke and Madden (2013) point that, in comparative static applications, mod-
eling of the labor market, particularly as it relates to wages and employment flex-
ibility, is one of the ways in which short-run and long-run analytical timeframes are 
commonly distinguished. In short-run applications—the authors go on—a common 
assumption is that institutional or structural features of the regional labor market 
generate short-run stickness in the regional wage rate. With sticky short-run regional 
wages, regional labor market pressures are mainly expressed as movements in short-
run regional employment. With short-run regional populations given, these short-
run regional employment movements are expressed as short-run movements in the 
regional employment rate and/or participation rate. In our model, the short-run clo-
sure assumes fixed regional population and labor supply, fixed regional wage differen-
tials, and fixed national real wages. Regional employment is driven by the assumptions 
on wage rates, which indirectly determine regional unemployment rates. Labor is, 
thus, mobile only across sectors within the same region. In the implementation of the 
long-run closure of the model, aggregate employment is determined by fixed popula-
tion change, fixed labor force participation rates, and the “natural” unemployment rate 
(the unemployment rate at the start of the simulation). The distribution of labor across 
regions and sectors is subsequently endogenously determined. It is assumed that 
interregional wage relativities are exogenous. As observed by Giesecke and Madden 
(2013), this translates to near exogeneity of the regional labor wage rate, with long-
run regional employment adjusting via long-run movements in regional populations. 
Labor is thus attracted to more competitive industries and regions. In essence, popula-
tion movements (i.e., interregional migration) keep overall household utility differen-
tials constant.
Another important distinction between short- and long-run closures relates to the 
treatment of the supply side of regional industry capital markets. In short-run closure, 
capital stock is fixed, while, in the long-run, policy changes can affect the capital stock. 
In the long-run, industry “re-location” becomes relevant since factors of production are 
assumed to be free to move among the regions. Investment decisions define the mar-
ginal re-location of activities, guiding the spatial distribution of capital stocks. Regional 
industry capital stocks adjust to move regional industry rates of return to the exoge-
nously determined benchmark rate of return. Capital is pulled toward more profitable 
industries, which causes interregional rates of return to converge.
On the demand side, investment expenditures are fixed in the short run—firms can-
not reevaluate their investment decisions in the short run. Household consumption fol-
lows household disposable income, and real government consumption, at both regional 
and central levels, is fixed. Trade balance adjusts to accommodate changes in govern-
ment deficit. In the long-run, movements in the components of trade balance (i.e., 
exports and imports) are reflected in the hypothesis of fixed share of trade balance in 
GDP. The government deficit is set exogenously, so that government expenditures can 
change in the margin, moving with changes in the endogenously determined changes in 
government revenues. Domestic absorption has to accommodate the balance of trade 
constraint.
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3  Integration of the ICGE and the transportation network module
A main goal of the research reported in this paper is to develop a framework to enable 
assessment of the socio-economic impacts of domestic integration policies in Egypt. As 
proposed in Haddad and Hewings (2005), we integrate a geo-coded transportation net-
work for Egypt with the ICGE model (Fig. 4). Thus, if one wants to simulate changes in 
the network, which might affect relative accessibility (e.g., road improvements, invest-
ments in new highways, etc.), a transportation cost matrix can be calculated ex ante and 
ex post, and mapped to the ICGE model through transportation cost functions. This 
mapping includes two stages, one associated with the calibration phase, and another 
with the simulation phase.
Following Haddad and Hewings (2005), the set of equations that specify purchasers’ 
prices in the ICGE model imposes zero pure profits in the distribution of commodities 
to different users. Prices paid for commodity i from source s in region q by each user 
equate to the sum of its basic value and the transportation costs associated with the use 
of the relevant margin-commodity.
The role of the margin-commodity is to facilitate flows of commodities from points of 
production or points of entry to either domestic users or ports of exit. The margin-com-
modity, or, simply, margin, includes transportation services. Combined, they take 
account of transfer costs in a broad sense.10 The margin demand equations in the model 
show that the demands for margins are proportional to the commodity flows with which 
the margins are associated; moreover, a technology change component allows changes in 
the implicit transportation rate.11
The model uses a general functional form for the equations of margin demand, for 
different users. Let x be a flow of some good i from some region s to region r, and m 
the quantity of the required transportation margin.12 Assuming m = Aηx, with param-
eter η specific to i, s and r, and A, specific to i, s and r, being a shift variable used to 
rescale the reference estimates of η. Thus, an integration scenario, reducing transpor-
tation costs from region s to region r by say 10 %, is modeled by reducing A by 10 % for 
all goods i.13
We use a stylized national-level road network data in a GIS setting obtained from the 
Egyptian Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). We merged 
this database with information on specific technical attributes of the links provided, 
namely the maximum speed according to the type of road. In the ICGE model, it is 
assumed that the locus of production and consumption in each governorate is located in 
its capital; international trade is assumed to occur only through the Alexandria port. 
Thus, the relevant travel times associated with the flows of commodities from points of 
production (or port of entry) to points of consumption (or port of exit) are limited to a 
matrix of times between governorate capitals. Moreover, to account for interregional 
10 Hereafter, transportation services and margins will be used interchangeably.
11 In the case of international imported goods, the implicit transportation margin is interpreted as the costs at the port 
of entry plus land transportation costs to the consuming region, while for foreign exports it includes transportation 
costs from the producing region and the costs at the port of exit.
12 Similarly, one can think about flows of exports from the producing region to the port, or flows of imports from the 
port to the consuming region.
13 The process of calibration of transportation costs assumes A = 1 for all i, s and r in the benchmark year. Thus, η 
can be calibrated by calculating the relationship between m and x directly from the interregional input–output data-
base.
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transportation costs, we let trade within the governorate take place on an abstract route 
between the capital and a point located at a distance equal to half the minimum time 
from capital cities of all adjacent governorates. The transportation module calculates the 
minimum interregional times, considering the existing road network.14
Calibrating the ICGE model requires information on the transportation margins 
related to each commodity flow. Aggregate information for margins on intersectoral 
transactions, capital creation, household consumption, and exports are available at the 
national level. Thus, disaggregating this information for commodity flows across gover-
norates to generate interregional input–output accounts of Egypt was somewhat prob-
lematic.15 Travel times were then associated with the transportation costs implicit in the 
flows in ICGE social accounting matrix by assuming tariff functions using data on gen-
eral cargo prices (for domestic trade flows) and container prices (for international trade 
flows) from a survey conducted in Felkner et al. (2012). We used a gravity model formu-
lation with the general functional form: tariffi = αi ∗ timeβi, where tariffi is the road 
transportation price for shipment i, i = general cargo, container; and time refers to the 
minimum travel distance between two governorate capitals. Long-haul economies are 
shown in Table 4, which presents the estimates of the parameters for the two functions. 
For each origin–destination pair, such a calibration strategy explicitly accounts for key 
elements of Egypt’s integrated interregional economic system, namely: (a) the type of 
14 According to the Ministry of Transport of Egypt, 94 % of the nation’s freight is transported by road (http://www.
comcec.org/).
15 This procedure was first documented in Haddad and Hewings (2005).
Fig. 4 Transportation network for Egypt
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trade involved (transportation costs vary according to specific commodity flows); (b) the 
actual travel time on the current transportation network (distance and time matters); 
and (c) scale effects in transportation in the form of long-haul economies.
4  Analytically important transportation links
In this section, we look at the issue of structural sensitivity analysis in CGE models. We 
borrow from the field of influence literature (Sonis and Hewings 1989, 1992) the idea of 
inverse important coefficients in order to identify strategic transportation links in the 
context of the Egyptian interregional system.16 Given the nature of CGE models, we can 
also expand the concept of measurement of the field of influence statistics in order to 
generate qualitative structures of influences based on different policy targets.
In order to identify the analytically most important structural links, we proceed 
with a thorough decomposition of the results of simulations that consider the role of 
small changes in transportation costs. These incremental changes are associated with 
(a group of ) coefficient changes computed from the information contained in the ini-
tial solution. In essence, they are elasticities. In other words, we can identify the elas-
ticity of the model’s overall findings to changes effected upon specific transportation 
links.17 In summary, fields of influence of various structural links can be associated 
with specific policy outcomes.
For each pair of regions, we calculate the contribution of (small) changes in transpor-
tation costs to specific outcomes, considering different dimensions of regional policy. 
We look at the effects on national GDP and national real household consumption. While 
GDP effects attempt to measure systemic efficiency, we use changes in real house-
hold consumption as a simple index of welfare. Moreover, we also consider impacts 
on regional efficiency, through the differential impacts on GRP for the seven Egyptian 
macroregions (Greater Cairo, Alexandria, Asyout, Delta, North Upper Egypt, Suez, 
and South Upper Egypt). The spatial results are staged in order to evaluate the extent to 
which analytically important links optimize specific policy goals.
16 Haddad and Hewings (2007) show the mathematical equivalence of the structures of CGE models of the Johansen 
class, and of input–output models.
17 This approach allows considering the two-way dimension of a transportation link between any two regions, i.e. the 
way “in” and the way “out”.
Table 4 Estimated road transport cost functions—general cargo and container
Obs.: lcargocost log of price per ton, lcont log of price of container, ltime log of travel time
Variable Coefficient SE t-Statistic Prob.
Dependent variable: lcargocost
Ltime 0.65914 0.03852 17.11 0.000




Ltime 0.71851 0.02769 25.95 0.000
Constant 3.65506 0.15317 23.86 0.000
R2 0.9258
N 56
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The basic experiment consists of evaluating an overall 1 % reduction in transportation 
cost within the country and with external markets. In other words, for every domestic 
origin–destination pair, the use of transportation margins is reduced by 1  %; in addi-
tion, transportation margins related to international trade flows (both foreign imports 
and exports) are also reduced by 1 %. The simulations are carried out under both short- 
and long-run environments to obtain a sense of outcome sensitivity to the different clo-
sure rules. In this vein, we are able to assess potential efficiency and welfare gains to the 
Egyptian economy associated with domestic integration issues, i.e., increases in the free-
ness of trade, in the context of increasing competition within the country.
To obtain a finer perspective on the analytically most important links for optimizing a 
given policy target (regional/national efficiency and national welfare), we decompose the 
results into “governorate to governorate,” “governorate to foreign region,” and “foreign 
region to governorate” links. Key links (top 50) based on their influence on each policy 
target are highlighted in Figs. 5, 6 and 7.   
Figure  5 presents the short- and long-run results for national GDP and national 
welfare. Higher contributions to national GDP in the short run are mainly associated 
with transportation cost reductions within governorates (intraregional) located in the 
Lower Egypt; overall better access to imports; better access from governorates in the 
Lower Egypt to Cairo; and lower transportation costs for exports from the Greater 
Cairo region. In the long run, a similar pattern emerges. The main difference is that 
higher contributions for GDP growth arise also from reductions in transportation costs 
between governorates in the Lower Egypt and the North Upper Egypt, where produc-
tion of Sector 2 (mining and quarrying) is concentrated, playing an important role in the 
structure of interindustry linkages and capital creation (especially Menia). Furthermore, 
better access to imports by some of the governorates becomes less important.
Focusing on the top five links, the higher contributions to national GDP are associ-
ated with a better access from Giza to Cairo, as well as a better access to foreign imports 
for some of the governorates throughout the country (Cairo, Giza, Sharkia, and Qena). 
In the long run, the top five links contribute with 40.1 % of the total GDP effect (27.7 % 
in the short run); they are associated with transportation cost reductions within the 
Greater Cairo region (Cairo–Cairo, Cairo-Giza, and Giza-Cairo links) and better access 
to imports by Cairo and Menia.
In terms of the contributions to welfare, the main links in the long run are almost the 
same as those verified for GDP. There is a slight difference in the short run, however, 
when compared to the GDP analysis: some important links appear to be associated with 
better access of governorates in the Upper Egypt (Asyout, Suhag, Qena, and Aswan) to 
local and regional markets.
Figures 6 and 7 present the results for the key links based on their influence on real GRP in 
the different Egyptian macroregions. Notice that the set of most influential transportation 
links varies according to different (regional) policy targets. For instance, in the short run, 
GRP effects in the Greater Cairo region related with domestic integration seem to be more 
influenced by improved access to domestic suppliers for the governorates that compose the 
region (Cairo, Giza, and Kalyoubia), as well as better access to foreign markets (imports and 
exports). This seems to be the pattern for all the regions: a more supplier-oriented access in 
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the domestic markets for the governorates in the region, with improved domestic backward 
linkages, and both market and supplier-oriented access to foreign markets.
In the long run, macroregions in general tend to be relatively more (positively) affected 
by transportation cost reductions in the Lower Egypt, as well as improvements in the 
intermediate-good-producing regions in the North Upper Egypt region. The differ-
ences in terms of the sets of most influential transportation links related to the different 
regional policy targets refer to the inclusion of improved links to (domestic and foreign) 
markets of the regional governorates.
4.1  Summary18
We can summarize the simulation results focusing on the implications of domestic inte-
gration for regional growth. We also enable readers to visualize the Egyptian economy so 
they can explore its spatial nature through interregional backward and forward linkages. 
We find this helps understanding the different patterns of spatial integration from each 
region’s perspective that are embodied in the results of the exercise.
18 See Haddad et al. (2011).
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Fig. 5 Analytically important transportation links (top 50). National targets
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Fig. 6 Analytically important transportation links (top 50). Regional targets
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The basic information used to build the HBC19 figures below is drawn from the matri-
ces of results that contain, for each governorate, the GRP effect of reductions in trans-
portation costs for every origin–destination pair in the Egyptian system. A typical 
19 HBC stands for hinge-based-circle.
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Fig. 7 Analytically important transportation links (top 50). Regional targets
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element of this matrix is yrsq, the percentage change in GRP in region r, associated with a 
1 % reduction in transportation costs from s to q.
It is possible to aggregate this information (Table 5) in such a way that we obtain three 
summary measures reflecting the isolated effects of increasing the region’s direct access 
to markets (MAr); increasing direct access to suppliers (SAr); as well as the indirect 
effects associated with transportation costs reductions outside the region—the substitu-
tion effects (SEr). Notice that we do not consider changes in intraregional trade costs, 
hence the zero effect in the first cell.20
In order to get comparable results for each region, we normalize the information pre-
sented in Table 5. Then, we consider the values of MAr, SAr, and SEr as vectors and pro-
ceed with a normalization based on standard vector analysis. It is important to notice 
that the sign of the normalized effects remains the same, since we take the norm of each 
vector.
The normalized vectors for MA and SA are represented in a Cartesian plan, over their 
respective axes (MA is represented in the x-axis and SA is in the y-axis), and their vec-
tor sum results in a vector that defines the direction and the sense in which the point 
will be plotted. The following step is to take the intersection of this resultant vector and 
a circumference with radius one and center in the origin of the Cartesian plan defined 
before. Departing from this so defined point, we plot the normalized vector of the SE 
(with the same direction of the resultant vector mentioned above). Positive values for SE 
are represented as pointing to the center of the circumference, and, thus, fall inside the 
circle. Negative values, on the other hand, fall outside the circle. This is so that the win-
ning regions, regarding the SE effect, are located inside the circle.
The steps mentioned before produce the areas represented in Fig. 8 with all kinds of 
signs combinations between the three effects. Taking the data from the Egyptian system, 
we obtain a comparison of the importance of each effect to the regions, what allows us 
to better understand the Egyptian interregional system. We end up with the HBC figures 
for Egypt (Figs. 9, 10).
As can be seen from inspection of Fig. 9, for most governorates we find, in the short 
run, positive GRP effects related to better access to markets and suppliers, as well as 
positive effects associated with the substitution effect.21 In other words, as overall trans-
portation costs go down, a governorate tends benefit directly from better accessibility to 
its trade partners, and, indirectly, by trade efficiency improvements related to transpor-
tation links outside its direct domain. Furthermore, access to suppliers seems to be 
20 For each matrix of results, the main diagonal is zero.
21 Governorates in the area of MA(+), SA(+), SE(+).
Table 5 Summary matrix of results for real GRP effects
R study region, R rest of the system (domestic and international)
Origin Destination
r R
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relatively more important than access to markets in the short run. Given our assumption 
on fixed capital stocks, market access results are weakened by the effects of inelastic sup-
ply schedules for capital-intensive sectors. Finally, domestic integration is effectively a 
tide that lifts all boats—it generates positive overall growth across all Egyptian 
governorates.
As we allow capital and labor to become mobile, four fairly distinct groups of gover-
norates arise. One common feature is that, for all governorates, better access to markets 
generates higher GRP in the context of our simulations. For most of them (19 out of 
27), improving access to suppliers also affects GRP positively. Still negative effects asso-
ciated with substitution effects prevail within an important group of governorates. In 
other words, as overall transportation costs go down, some governorates tend to benefit 
directly from improved accessibility with trade partners, but are also hampered due to 
Fig. 8 Schematic representation of the HBC figure
Fig. 9 Typology of regions according to their GRP growth-orientation with increasing integration—short run 
(HBC figure)
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the deviation of traded commodities to more profitable markets (from the perspective 
of supplying governorates). There is also a subgroup of governorates, whose GRP could 
potentially be negatively affected by transportation cost reductions to their supplying 
regions. In such cases, stronger penetration of competing imports hampers local pro-
duction, reducing GRP. Table 6 shows the governorates classified into the four groups. 
Note that governorates in the area MA(+), SA(+), SE(−) are either located in the 
Greater Cairo Region or are homes to main Egyptian ports. This fortifies the idea that 
the negative substitution effects are likely due to the penetration of competing domestic 
and foreign imports.
Fig. 10 Typology of regions according to their GRP growth-orientation with increasing integration—long 
run (HBC figure)
Table 6 Typology of regions according to their GRP growth-orientation with increasing integra-
tion—long run




























Access to markets Access to markets
Indirect effect
(+) (-)
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5  Network effects
The analysis in the previous section considered a general perturbation in transportation 
costs to demonstrate properties of the model. Adding network effects is a natural second 
step to explore features of our modeling approach in order to reinforce policy relevance 
for the Egyptian case. What if Egypt foresaw an overall gain in systemic efficiency of its 
transportation network? Given the structure of the model, which regions would benefit 
most? Which could be most at risk?
We run a set of simulations in which the speed attributed to each link in the stylized 
network increases by 10  %, increasing travel times and, consequently, transportation 
costs (Sect. 3). In this context, more remote regions for which transportation costs rep-
resent a higher share in their cost structures will face relatively stronger direct impacts. 
Again, the simulations are carried out under the short- and long-run closure rules. We 
focus the analysis on the effects on the allocation of economic activity, looking at the 
model results for changes in GRP. More specifically, we look at the spatial effects and the 
main structural drivers of the outcomes.
Figure 11 maps the distribution of the GRP impacts across governorates, considering 
the first two moments of the distributions. The results show that, in general, peripheral, 
more remote governorates tend to benefit most from large efficiency gains in the net-
work, while governorates in the dynamic core of the country tend to benefit least.
Figure 12 presents the Moran scatterplots22 of the two sets of results, as well as the asso-
ciated spatial correlation coefficients Moran’s I.23 The calculated values of such coefficients 
provide an indication that the spatial autocorrelation for GRP impacts is positive in both 
cases, and stronger in the long run (0.3975 in the short run and 0.4358 in the long run).
How important is the existing economic structure in explaining the short- and long-
run spatial results associated with general efficiency gains in the transportation network 
in Egypt? Do backward and forward linkages matter? How about remoteness? To answer 
these questions, we regress the simulation results (GRP impacts) against selected struc-
tural coefficients of the model. For each set of results, we specify three different models 
based on different measures of remoteness: cost of shipping exports through Alexandria 
port (COSTEXP), cost of shipping imports from Alexandria port (COSTIMP), and cost 
of shipping goods to Cairo (COSTCAI).24 The regressions are shown in Tables 7 and 8.
A limited set of structural indicators explain around 90 percent of the variation across 
governorates in the three specifications for the short-run GRP results (Table 7). Explana-
tions for specific regional results should consider structural and parametric aspects of 
the data base. Governorates that present higher increases in their output tend to have an 
overall lower share of foreign imports, benefiting from lower penetration of competing 
imports; however, the higher the share of interregional imports, the higher the benefit 
to increase output in the region, as substitution effects at this stage of the chain appear 
to translate into cost advantages. Also, regions that face stronger positive effects tend to 
22 The Moran scatterplot shows the spatial lag (i.e. the average of the GRP effects for the neighbors) on the vertical axis and 
the value at each governorate on the horizontal axis. Note that the variables are expressed in standardized form with mean 
zero and standard deviation equal to one (Anselin 1999, p. 261).





, where n is the number of locations, yi is the data value 
of attribute in analysis (in our case, GRP impacts), wij is a spatial weight for the pair of locations i and j.
24 Correlation between any two of these variables is very high: COSTEXP − COSTIMP = 0.9969; COSTEXP − COST-
CAI = 0.8767; COSTIMP − COSTCAI = 0.8710.
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present a larger share of their sales to foreign consumers. A higher capital/labor ratio 
seems to hamper economic performance in the short run, as employment expansion 
turns out to be less feasible. Finally, governorates with initial higher transportation costs 
to foreign (COSTEXP) and domestic (COSTCAI) markets, as well as those with higher 
initial costs of shipping foreign imports to their local markets (COSTIMP) appear more 
likely to be affected positively by policies enabling the transportation improvements.
In the long run, the peripheral governorates also obtain GRP benefits from the shock. 
The impact of the efficiency gains in the network favors activity levels outside Egypt’s 
core. In fact the periphery gains at the expense of the core, particularly the delta regions. 
Fig. 11 Effects of 10 % increase in the network speed on GRP—standard deviation maps. a Short run and b 
long run
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Thus, a relative spatial deconcentration of national GDP arises. Structural indicators 
related to import penetration (−), foreign export shares (+), and the three measures of 
remoteness (+) play a similar role in the long run. However, forward linkages in domes-
tic markets—as measured by the share of interregional exports in total sales—are most 
relevant to understanding GRP effects in the long run. Together, the selected structural 
indicators explain over 80 percent of the variation in GRP across governorates (Table 8).
6  Final remarks
There is a growing need for economic and socio-economic models for helping improv-
ing road management (World Road Association 2003, p. 7). This paper provides an 
attempt to meet this requirement in a developing country. We use a fully operational 
ICGE model implemented for the Egyptian economy. As noted elsewhere (Haddad et al. 
2011a, b, p. 46), the existing, commonly used policy tools to address issues related to 
the economic impacts of transportation infrastructure policies do not depict well critical 
channels through which exogenous and transportation policy shocks are transmitted to 
Fig. 12 Effects of 10 % increase in the network speed on GRP—Moran scatterplot. a Short run, b long run
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the various dimensions of regional economic structures. This paper looks at the Egyp-
tian case. It yields quantitative and qualitative insights (general equilibrium effects) into 
trade-offs commonly faced by policy makers when dealing with infrastructure projects 
in a spatial context. It shows that, given different policy options, decision makers face 
nontrivial choices, as different projects perform differently in different dimensions, usu-
ally presenting outcomes with different hierarchies related to multidimensional policy 
goals.
However, the reported simulations relate to prospective studies of general relevance 
for the understanding of the Egyptian integrated regional systems under the analytical, 
functional and numerical structures embedded in the model. Little emphasis is given to 
specific problems of the national reality. In other words, at this stage, the use of Egyp-
tian data to calibrate the ICGE model has the main role to demonstrate the ability of 
the modeling system to be applied for the country. Although relevant for the Egyptian 
case, the simulations represent generic scenarios of domestic integration, providing, at 
most, a heuristic validation about the proper functioning of the model rather than useful 
results to support policy decisions.
In this sense, the modeling effort reported here is just a start, and this paper is a mere 
demonstration of the framework’s potential. We find the model is clearly ready to address 
concrete economic issues that address planning needs. Such methods of interregional 
Table 7 Structural analysis of short-run GRP results
Obs.: GRP_SR percentage change in GRP, FOR import penetration in total consumption, EXP export share in total sales, 
INTER interregional share in total consumption, COSTEXP cost of shipping exports through Alexandria port, COSTIMP cost of 
shipping imports from Alexandria port, COSTCAI cost of shipping goods to Cairo, KL capital-labor ratio
Variable Coefficient SE t-Statistic Prob.
Dependent variable: GRP_SR
FOR −0.03547 0.00741 −4.78 0.000
EXP 0.00190 0.00050 3.81 0.001
INTER 0.00341 0.00115 2.96 0.007
COSTIMP 0.00002 4.55e−06 4.43 0.000
KL −0.01381 0.00325 −4.25 0.000
Constant 0.50978 0.12741 4.00 0.001
R2 0.8964
Dependent variable: GRP_SR
FOR −0.03540 0.0071 −4.98 0.000
EXP 0.00182 0.00048 3.79 0.001
INTER 0.00330 0.00112 2.95 0.008
COSTEXP 0.00002 4.34e−06 4.72 0.000
KL −0.01389 0.00315 −4.41 0.000
Constant 0.51351 0.12160 4.22 0.000
R2 0.9028
Dependent variable: GRP_SR
FOR −0.03890 0.00796 −4.89 0.000
EXP 0.00191 0.00055 3.49 0.002
INTER 0.00371 0.00126 2.94 0.008
COSCAI 0.00067 0.00019 43.56 0.002
KL −0.0141 0.00358 −3.94 0.001
Constant 0.55779 0.13847 4.03 0.001
R2 0.8750
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analysis are ultimately developed to evaluate the relative potential of policies. While it is 
important to know that transportation costs will decline in the face of related infrastructure 
investments, it is generally more important to be able to know how those cost reductions 
will affect the broader economic and social systems—at least in terms of the general mag-
nitude and direction (positively or negatively). When planning, being able to drill down for 
more detail (spatially and sectorally) can be quite important. In this vein, having the proper 
set of policy tools can enable consistent and comparable quantitative assessments of alter-
native strategies across sets of compatible or even competing policy alternatives.
In the aforementioned World Bank (2012) report Reshaping Egypt’s Economic Geogra-
phy: Domestic Integration as a Development Platform, the chapter by Felkner et  al. 
(2012) addresses some of these issues, in the Egyptian case. It does so by simulating, via 
GIS, the impacts on accessibility (policy target) under three alternative infrastructure 
improvement scenarios.25 Their results indicate that improvements in more congested 
areas tended to have superior network-wide cost savings across Egypt when compared 
to those improvements connecting to “lagging” areas. We obtain similar results for 
incremental infrastructure projects in a short-run framework. But we also find that 
25 The scenarios were specifically identified in discussions with Egyptian infrastructure experts as being key to the over-
all development of the larger Egyptian transport infrastructure: playing a key role in connecting key regions of Egypt, 
providing improved transport corridors to facilitate increased trade and shipping of goods, or facilitating transport for 
major metropolitan populations.
Table 8 Structural analysis of long-run GRP results
Obs.: GRP_LR percentage change in GRP, FOR import penetration in total consumption, EXP export share in total sales, 
SINTER interregional share in total sales, COSTEXP cost of shipping exports through Alexandria port, COSTIMP cost of 
shipping imports from Alexandria port, COSTCAI cost of shipping goods to Cairo
Variable Coefficient SE t-Statistic Prob.
Dependent variable: GRP_LR
FOR −0.39416 0.09334 −4.22 0.000
EXP 0.01897 0.00594 3.19 0.004
SINTER 0.01716 0.00585 2.94 0.008
COSTIMP 0.00026 0.00006 4.49 0.000
Constant 5.31718 1.52570 3.49 0.002
R2 0.8317
Dependent variable: GRP_LR
FOR −0.39860 0.09180 −4.34 0.000
EXP 0.01770 0.00590 3.00 0.007
SINTER 0.01719 0.00580 2.96 0.007
COSTEXP 0.00026 0.00006 4.57 0.000
Constant 5.40834 1.49628 3.61 0.002
R2 0.8342
Dependent variable: GRP_LR
FOR −0.42954 0.09558 −4.49 0.000
EXP 0.02066 0.00628 3.29 0.003
SINTER 0.01596 0.00617 2.59 0.017
COSTCAI 0.00909 0.00228 3.99 0.001
Constant 5.94323 1.55394 3.82 0.001
R2 0.8129
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transportation infrastructure mega-projects could induce the spatial deconcentration of 
economic activity in the long run. Thus, it is clear that the choice of a “best” transporta-
tion infrastructure program depends on policy intentions. Trade-offs vary with the 
nature of transportation investment alternatives: timing of outcomes (short run vs. long 
run), spatial distribution of socio-economic effects (regional vs. national), and who ben-
efits are just some of the trade-offs policymakers face.
Models are issue-specific; developing policy priorities based on answers from models 
that are inadequate for articulating particular issues can cause severe unintentional con-
sequences to crop up in the course of policymaking (see Agénor et al. 2007). It is there-
fore important for policy analysts to maintain a reasonably broad array of instruments in 
their tool bag. Our paper illustrates the potential of a unified interregional economic 
modeling approach for Egypt. Further amendments to it will cope with methodological 
advances in both economic and transport modeling.26 Still, we believe it already enables 
a fuller appreciation of a broader set of dimensions to Egyptian transportation policy.
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Appendix: The equation system of the ICGE model
The functional forms of the main groups of equations of the ICGE core are presented in 
this Appendix together with the definition of the main groups of variables, parameters 
and coefficients. 
The notational convention uses uppercase letters to represent the levels of the variables 
and lowercase for their percentage-change representation. Superscripts (u), u = 0, 1j, 2j, 3, 
4, 5, refer, respectively, to output (0) and to the five different regional-specific users of the 
products identified in the model: producers in sector j (1j), investors in sector j (2j), house-
holds (3), purchasers of exports (4), and government (5); the second superscript identifies 
the domestic region where the user is located. Inputs are identified by two subscripts: the 
first takes the values 1, …, g, for commodities, g + 1, for primary factors, and g + 2, for 
“other costs” (basically, taxes and subsidies on production); the second subscript identifies 
the source of the input, being it from domestic region b (1b) or imported (2), or coming 
from labor (1) or capital (2). The symbol (•) is employed to indicate a sum over an index.
Equations
Substitution between products from different regional domestic sources.
























i = 1, . . . , g; b = 1, . . . , q; (u) = 3 and (kj) for k = 1 and 2 and j = 1, . . . , h; r = 1, . . . ,R
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Substitution between domestic and imported products
Substitution between labor and capital
Intermediate and investment demands for composites commodities and primary 
factors
Household demands for composite commodities
Purchasers’ prices related to basic prices and margins (trade costs)
Foreign demands (exports) for domestic goods
Government demands






























































(i) u = (kj) for k = 1, 2 and j = 1, . . . , h
if u = (1j) then i = 1, . . . , g + 2
if u = (2j) then i = 1, . . . , g;
r = 1, . . . ,R
(5)







































i = 1, . . . , g; r = 1, . . . ,R
(6)
V (i, s, (u), r)p
(u)r
(is) = (B(i, s, (u), r))+
∑
m∈G
M(m, i, s, (u), r)p
(0)r
(m1),
i = 1, . . . , g; (u) = (3), (4), (5)
and (kj) for k = 1, 2 and j = 1, . . . , h; s = 1b, 2 for b = 1, . . . , q
































(m1) m, i = 1, . . . , g;
(u) = (3), (4b) for b = 1, . . . , r, (5) and (kj) for k = 1, 2;
j = 1, . . . , h; s = 1b, 2 for b = 1, . . . , r;
r = 1, . . . ,R
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Demand equals supply for regional domestic commodities
Regional industry revenue equals industry costs
Basic price of imported commodities
Cost of constructing units of capital for regional industries
Investment in period T
Capital stock in period T + 1—comparative statics
Definition of rates of return to capital
Relation between capital growth and rates of return
Other definitions in the CGE core include: import volume of commodities, components 
of regional/national GDP, regional/national price indices, wage settings, definitions of 



















M(l, i, s, (u), r)x
(is)(u)r
(l1)




























(i(2)) − e + t
(0)
(i(2)), i = 1, . . . , g
(13)













































(k) ), j = 1, . . . , h; r = 1, . . . ,R












(k) , j = 1, . . . , h; r = 1, . . . ,R
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(u) = (3) (4), (5), (6) and
(kj) for k = 1, 2 and j = 1, …, h;
if (u) = (1j) then i = 1, …, g + 2;
if (u) ≠ (1j) then i = 1, …, g;
s = 1b, 2 for b = 1, …, q; and i = 1, …, g and
s = 1, 2, 3 for i = g + 1
r = 1, …, R





(u) = (3), (4), (5), (6) and
(kj) for k = 1, 2 and j = 1, …, h;
if (u) = (1j) then i = 1, …, g + 2;
if (u) ≠ (1j) then i = 1, …, g;
s = 1b, 2 for b = 1, …, q; and i = 1, …, g and
s = 1, 2, 3 for i = g + 1
r = 1, …, R





(u) = (3) and (kj) for k = 1, 2 and
j = 1, …, h.
if (u) = (1j) then i = 1, …, g + 1;
if (u) ≠ (1j) then i = 1, …, g
r = 1, …, R
Demand for composite good or primary factor i by 




j = 1, …, h and s = 1, 2, 3
r = 1, …, R





i = 1, …, g, (u) = (3) and (kj) for k = 1, 2 and 
j = 1, …, h
r = 1, …, R
Technical change related to the use of good i by 
user (u) in region r
Cr Total expenditure by regional household in region r
Qr Number of households
z(u)r (u) = (kj) for k = 1, 2 and j = 1, …, h
r = 1, …, R
Activity levels: current production and investment 




i = 1, …, g; s = 1b, 2 for b = 1, …, q
r = 1, …, R





i = 1, …, g; s = 1b, 2 for b = 1, …, q
r = 1, …, R






m, i = 1, …, g; s = 1b, 2 for b = 1, …, q
(u) = (3), (4), (5) and
(kj) for k = 1, 2 and j = 1, …, h
r = 1, …, R
Demand for commodity (m1) to be used as a mar-




m, i = 1, …, g; s = 1b, 2 for b = 1, …, q
(u) = (3), (4), (5) and
(kj) for k = 1, 2 and j = 1, …, h
r = 1, …, R
Technical change related to the demand for com-
modity (m1) to be used as a margin to facilitate 




i = 1, …, g; j = 1, …, h
r = 1, …, R




i = 1, …, g; s = 1b, 2 for b = 1, …, q
r = 1, …, R








j = 1, …, h
r = 1, …, R




j = 1, …, h
r = 1, …, R
Capital stock in industry j in region r at the end of 





j = 1, …, h
r = 1, …, R





i = 1, …, g; s = 1b, 2 for b = 1, …, q
r = 1, …, R
Commodity and source-specific shift term for 
government expenditures in region r
f (5)r r = 1, …, R Shift term for government expenditures in region r
f (5) Shift term for government expenditures
ω Overall rate of return on capital (short run)
Page 32 of 33Haddad et al. Economic Structures  (2016) 5:25 
Variable Index ranges Description
rr(j) j = 1, …, h
r = 1, …, R






Parameter: elasticity of substitution between alternative sources of commodity or factor 
i for user (u) in region r
σ (0j)r Parameter: elasticity of transformation between outputs of different commodities in 




Parameter: returns to scale to individual primary factors in industry j in region r
βr(i) Parameter: marginal budget shares in linear expenditure system for commodity i in 
region r
γ r(i) Parameter: subsistence parameter in linear expenditure system for commodity i in 
region r
εr(j) Parameter: sensitivity of capital growth to rates of return of industry j in region r
ηr(is) Parameter: foreign elasticity of demand for commodity i from region r
B(i, s, (u), r) Input–output flow: basic value of (is) used by (u) in region r
M(m, i, s, (u), r) Input–output flow: basic value of domestic good m (m = trade) used as a margin to 
facilitate the flow of (is) to (u) in region r
V (i, s, (u), r) Input–output flow: purchasers’ value of good or factor i from source s used by user (u) in 
region r
Y (i, j, r) Input–output flow: basic value of output of domestic good i by industry j from region r
Qr(j) Coefficient: ratio, gross to net rate of return
G Set: {1,2, …, g}, g is the number of composite goods
G* Set: {1,2, …, g + 1}, g + 1 is the number of composite goods and primary factors
H Set: {1,2, …, h}, h is the number of industries
U Set: {(3), (4), (5), (6), (k j) for k = 1, 2 and j = 1, …, h}
U* Set: {(3), (k j) for k = 1, 2 and j = 1, …, h}
S Set: {1, 2, …, r + 1}, r + 1 is the number of regions (including foreign)
S* Set: {1, 2, …, r}, r is the number of domestic regions
Received: 1 March 2016   Accepted: 20 September 2016
References
Agénor PR, Izquierdo A, Jensen HT (2007) Adjustment policies, poverty, and unemployment: the IMMPA framework. 
Blackwell Publishing, Oxford
Álvarez-Martínez MT, Lahr ML (2013). Toward Frameshifting: a discussion of advances in econometric + IO modeling. 
Unpublished paper presented in at the 2013 conference of the association of University Business and Economic 
Research, Richmond, Virginia. October 12–15
Anselin L (1999) Interactive techniques and exploratory spatial data analysis. In: Longley PA, Goodchild MF, Maguire DJ, 
Rhind DW (eds) Geographic information system: principles, techniques, management and applications. Wiley, New 
York, pp 251–264
Aroca PA, Guo D, Hewings GJD (2008) Spatial convergence in China, 1952–1999. In: Wan G (ed) Inequality and growth in 
Modern China. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 125–143
Dixon PB, Parmenter BR (1996) Computable general equilibrium modelling for policy analysis and forecasting. In: Amman 
HM, Kendrick DA, Rust J (eds) Handbook of computational economics, vol 1, 1st edn. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 3–85
Eby Konan D, Maskus K (1996) A computable general equilibrium analysis of Egyptian trade liberalization scenarios. 
World Bank working paper no. 97-1, August
Felkner J, Wilson A, Blankenspoor B (2012) Accessibility and transport costs in Egypt: an empirical analysis. In: Reshaping 
Egypt’s economic geography, vol 2. World Bank, Washington, DC
Fujita M, Krugman P (2004) The new economic geography: past, present and the future. Pap Reg Sci 83:139–164
Page 33 of 33Haddad et al. Economic Structures  (2016) 5:25 
Giesecke JA, Madden JR (2013) Regional computable general equilibrium modeling. In: Dixon PB, Jorgenson DW (eds) 
Handbook of computable general equilibrium modeling. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 379–475
Haddad EA (1999) Regional inequality and structural changes: lessons from the Brazilian experience. Ashgate, Aldershot
Haddad EA (2014a) Spatial perspectives of increasing freeness of trade in Lebanon. Ann Reg Sci. doi:10.1007/
s00168-014-0615-3
Haddad EA (2014b) Trade and Interdependence in Lebanon: an interregional input–output perspective. J Dev Econ Polic 
16:5–45
Haddad EA, Hewings GJD (2005) Market imperfections in a spatial economy: some experimental results. Q Rev Econ 
Finance 45:476–496
Haddad EA, Hewings GJD (2007) Analytically important transportation links: a field of influence approach to CGE models. 
Rev Bras Estudos Regionais Urbanos 1:63–84
Haddad EA, Barufi AMB, Costa SM (2011a) Regional integration in Colombia: a spatial CGE application. Sci Reg Ital J Reg 
Sci 10:3–28
Haddad EA, Perobelli FS, Domingues EP, Aguiar M (2011b) Assessing the ex ante economic impacts of transportation 
infrastructure policies in Brazil. J Dev Eff 3:44–61
Hendy R, Zaki C (2013) Assessing the effects of trade liberalization on wage inequalities in Egypt: a microsimulation 
analysis. Int Trade J 27(1):63–104
Hu B, McAleer M (2004) Input–output structure and growth in China. Math Comput Simul 64:193–202
Lahr ML (2001) Reconciling domestication techniques, the notion of re-exports, and some comments on regional 
accounting. Econ Syst Res 13:166–179
Peter MW, Horridge M, Meagher GA, Naqvi F, Parmenter BR (1996) The theoretical structure of MONASH-MRF. Preliminary 
Working Paper No. OP-85, IMPACT Project, Monash University, Clayton
Sonis M, Hewings GJD (1989) Error and sensitivity input–output analysis: a new approach. In: Miller RE, Polenske KR, Rose 
AZ (eds) Frontiers of input–output analysis. Oxford University Press, New York
Sonis M, Hewings GJD (1992) Coefficient change in input–output models: theory and applications. Econ Syst Res 
4:143–157
Spencer JE (1988) Computable general equilibrium, trade, factor mobility, and the regions. In: Harrigan F, McGregor PG 
(eds) London: recent advances in regional economic modelling. London papers in regional science 19, London, Pion
World Bank (2009) World development report 2009: reshaping economic geography. Washington D.C, USA
World Bank (2012). Reshaping Egypt’s economic geography: domestic integration as a development platform. Poverty 
reduction and economic management department (MNSPR), Middle East and North Africa Region, Document of 
the World Bank, vol 1 and 2, June
World Road Association (2003) The role of economic and socio-economic models in road management. PIARC Technical 
Committee on Road Management, Paris
Yang L, Lahr ML (2008) Labor productivity differences in China 1987–1997: an interregional decomposition analysis. Rev 
Reg Stud 38:319–341
